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CAPITAL FLIGHT FROM THE PHILIPPINES,1962-1986
James K. Boyce and Lyuba Zarsky
Introduction
This paper presentsquantitative measuresof the annual flow and
cumulativestock of capital flight from the Philippinesin the 25-year
periodfrom 1962 to 1986.
The most-publicized instancesof capitalflightfrom the Philippines
involvethe assetsof ex-PresidentFerdinandMarcos,hisfamily,and his
closeassociates. 1Butthe phenomenonwas morewidespread.The first
FinanceMinisterof the Aquinogovernment,the lateJaime Ongpin,told
a groupof bankersin 1986that "everysuccessfulbusinessman,lawyer,
accountant,doctor,and dentistI knowhassomeform of cashor assets
whichhe began to squirrelabroadafter MarcosdeclaredMartialLaw in
1972 and, in the pi;ocess,frightenedevery Filipinowho had anythingto
lose" (Shaplen 1986, p.61).
Past estimatesof Philippinecapitalflight vary widely, depending
uponthe data and methodologyemployed.Forexample,Erbe (1985, p.
271) reportszero capital flight in the period 1976-82, while Morgan
GuarantyTrust Co. (1986) reports $7.0 billionin the same period.The
measures.usedin this report differ from previousestimatesin that:
a. They are based upon more complete,stillunpublishedesti*
mates of the country'sexternaldebt outstanding;
b. They includeadjustmentsfor changes in debt outstanding
arisingfrom fluctuationsin the yen/dollarexchangerate;
c. They incorporatethe net effectof misinvoicing of exportsand
imports;
d. Theyderivethe cumulativestockof flight capitalin realterms
and with imputedinterestearnings;and
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e. They span a longerperiod.We also report measureson an
annual basis so as to reveal the timing as well as the total
magnitudeof capitalflight.Alternativeestimatesseem to indi-
cate the sensitivityof the resultsto the methodologywe em-
ployed.
The paper isorganizedas follows:The secondsectiondiscusses
the conceptof capitalflightand proposesa definitionwhich restsupon
the notionof contestedcontrolover capital. Sectionthree enumerates
the principalmechanismsby whichcapitalfledthe Philippinesin recent
decades.The fourthsectionpresentsalternativepreliminarymeasuresof
annualflowsof flightcapital:a "hotmoney"measurebased on balance-
of-paymentsdata, andthree "residual"measureswhichdeductnon-flight
uses of externalfinancefrom totalinflowsto obtainestimatesof capital
flight.Sectionfiveexplainsadjustments tothesemeasuresto capturethe
net effectof misinvoicing of exportsand imports. Sectionsix showsthe
final estimatesof the flowsand stockof flightcapital, incorporatingad-
justmentsfor inflationand interestearningsto derive measureswhich
canbe compared,for example,tothe country'soutstanding externaldebt
at the end of 1986. Our conclusions are summarizedinthe last section,
The Concept of 'Capital Flight'
Capital is mobile,albeit not perfectlyso. As a whole, cumulated
gross external liabilitiesworldwideamountedto US$2621 billionfrom
1977 to 1983.2 What portionof these liabilitiesshouldbe considereda
"capitalflight"is a matterof debate.
We define capitalflightasthe movementof privatecapitalfromone
jurisdictionto another in order to reduce the actual or potential level of
social control over the capita/. Within a country, capital can flee a
particularprovinceor regionto escape legalor other socialconstraints.
International capitalflight,the objectof this study,refersto such move-
mentsof capitalfrom one sovereignnationto another.
This definitionof capitalflight iscloseto that advancedby several
contributors to the recentliteratureonthe subject.Dooley(1986, p. 15),
for example, definescapital flightas those capital outflowswhich are
"motivated by the desire of residents to obtain financial assets and
earnings on those assets which remain outside the control of the
domesticauthorities."Similarly,Depplerand Williamson(1987, pp. 41)
z IntemalJonalMonetaryFund (IMF 1987b, Table 3, p. 13). At the same time, the
reportedincreasein cumulatedexternalassets was US$2324 billion.This means nearly
US$300 billionof recordedinflows(liabilities)were unmatchedby the recorded outflows
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write that the "problemwith capitalflightisthat resourcesescape those
who seek to exercisesomedegree of controlover how the fundsmay
be used."
In this paper,capitalflightas a conceptrestsuponthe proposition
thatprivatecontrolovercapitalis seldomabsolute.Rather, it is circum-
scribedby a rangeof socialcontrols.Someof these socialcontrolsare
codifiedin existinglaws; examplesincludetaxation, exchangecontrol
whichrestrictthe free exitofcapitalfroma country,and regulationsupon
the usestowhichcapitalcanbe put.Socialcontrolsalsorefertosocietal
normsand expectationswhich,thoughnot formalizedin law, constrain
individual controlovercapital,and extra-legalexactionsbygovernmental
or non-governmental authorities.Moreover,thereisalwaysa potential for
social controlsto be extended should economic or political circum-
stanceschange. This risk itselfconstitutesanotherdimensionof social
controlover privatecapital.
The phenomenon ocapitalflightthusarisesfromthe factthatcontrol
overcapitaliscontested. 3 Inthe realworld,absoluteprivatecontrol,un-
fettered by social control, is the exceptionrather than the rule. The
degree and natureof socialcontroldiffersamong nations,and it is this
ditferentialwhichtriggerscapital flight. 4
Capitalflightis sometimescontrastedto "normal"capital outflows
motivatedby higherexpectedreturnsor portfoliodiversification(see, for
example, Cumby and Levich 1987, pp. 30-31). But while capitalflight
may be a responseto abnormalcircumstances, it is not,in and of itself,
an abnormal activity.As Lessardand Williamson(1987, p. 201) remark,
capital flight is "the result of individual agents reacting in the way that is
posited as rational by economic theory and accepted as normal in
industrial countries."
Whether capital flight is regarded as socially beneficial or harmful
depends, of course,upon on.e*snotionof socialwelfare; but judgments
are likelytO vary fromcase to case accordingto the specificcircum-
stances. One may, for example, laud the flight of capital from Nazi
Germany,butdeplorethe exportof capitalbya dictatorinanticipationof
his future retirement.
In theory, efforts by private owners of capital to reduce social
control overtheir assetscan be distinguished from efforts to increase
the rateof returnon thoseassets.5 As Waiter (1987, p. 105) observes,
3The phenomenonof "contestedendowments"is akinto "contestedexchange"(on
which see Bowles and Gintis 1988).
' In recentyears, internationalcompetitionforfundsamong "haven"countrieshas
contributed to further loosening of taxation on non-resident investment income; see
Lessardand Williamson(1987, pp. 240-241).
8Considerthe differencebetween a shiftfrom localcurrencyinto domestically-held
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one cost of the confidentiality obtainedthroughcapitalflightmay be a
lowerexpectedrateof return.In practice,the twomotivesareoftencon-
flared, making it difficultto distinguishcapital flight from the broader
conceptof "residentcapital outflow"whichcomprisesall private, non-
banking system capital exports. Moreover, the flight and non-flight
motivesfor capitaloutflowsmay be mutuallyreinforcing.For example,
capitalflightcontributes to pressureonthe exchangerate,whichinturn
may sparkeffortsto increasethe rate of returnon assetsvia dollariza-
tion. This would add to pressureon the peso-dollarrate; and if this
increasesthe probabilityof greater social controlson private capital,
furthercapitalflightcould result.
The exportofcapitalfromthe Philippines occurredforthe mostpart
in violationof Philippinelaw. However,the boundarybetweenlegal and
illegaltransfers is fuzzy, since a number of "laws" were made and
modifiedby secretpresidentialdecrees. 8As a U.S. congressional staffer
toldjournalists,"Marcoscouldhave exemptedhis friendsfrom any one
of the regulations,and you'd never be able to tell" (Carey and Ellison
1985).
In such a setting,the problemof distinguishing capitalflightfrom
other capital movementsis simplified:virtuallyall residentcapitalouh
flows can be classified as capital flight by virtue of their illegality.
Reducing social control over capital may not have been the sole
motivation for capita}flight, but it was one intended effect.
Mechanisms of Capital Flight•
The processof capitalflightfromthe Philippines involvestwosteps:
the acquisition of hardcurrency,andthe exitofcapitalfromthe country.
These can be accomplishedby a numberof mechanisms,includingthe
following:
dollars in anticipation of devaluation and the export of capital out of the country,
Dollarization couldprotectthe assetowner'srate of returnwithoutthelossof socialcontrol
•involvedin capital flight. This was the Philippinegovernment'srationalefor permitting
commercialand foreignbanksto set up ForeignCurrencyDepositUnitsoperatingunder
Central BankCircularNos. 343 and 547. The difficulties inherentin sucha distinctionwere
demonstratedin Mexico when dollar-indexedfinancial instruments("Mex-dollars")were
declared inconvertibleat the free market rate when that country'sdebt crisisbroke in
August 1982 (Zedillo 1987, p. 182).
e Presidentialdecreesin the early 1970sand again in 1983 made it illegaltoexport
large amounts of cash or to hold foreign exchange accounts without Central Bank
approval.For details on currencytransferabilityrestrictions, see Cowitt(1985, pp. 669-
670). The legal situationwas differentin the mid-1960s when Philippineresidentslived
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Cash Transfers
The physicaltransferof cash or other monetarYinstrumentspay-
abletothe bearer(suchastraveller'schecksor cashier'schecks)isone
mechanismof capitalflight.In the Philippines, the maincurrencytrans-
ferred is reportedlyUS dollars;these are exchangedfor pesoson the
black market by tourists,visitingbusinessmen,US militarYpersonnel,
and Philippineresidentsworkingabroad. 7At least untilthe early 1980s,
dollarswere alsosoldonthe "Binondo"blackmarketby the government-
owned PhilippineNationalBank (PNB), as reported by Thompsonand
Slayton(1985). 'q'heprimarymotivationbehindsuchaction,"according
to Thompson and Slayton (1985, p. 72), '_vas to hurt black market
traders and to facilitatetheir linancial cooperation'with certain highly-
placed governmentofficials."
Acquireddollarsin the Philippines can be physicallytransferredin
three principalways:
a. via personalsmuggling;
b. via the use of hired courierswho charge a fee (Carey and
Ellison[1.985]report a figure of five percent) for guidingthe
moneypast customsofficials;and
c. via the mails.6
Newspaperreportsindicatedthat followingthe Aquinoassassinationin
1983, as much as US$3 millionper day was leaving the Philippines
throughthe Manilaairport(Carey and Ellison1985).
A varianton the cash transfermechanismis the wire transmission
services providedby the black marketeersbased in Manila'sBinondo
district;theseare knowncollectivelyasthe "Binondo CentralBank."The
Binondobankersacquiredollarsonthe blackmarket and smugglethem
to Hong Kong for deposit in major banks. An individualcan provide
pesos to a BinondointermediarY,who instructsa Hong Kong bank to
wire dollars to the customer'soverseas account.The customerthen
confirmsthat the depositwas made by contractinghisor her overseas
bank.g
Exportsof pesos are less common although there is a market for Philippine
currencyin Hong Kong.
oCarey and Ellison (1985) report a case in which Oeak & Company's San
Franciscooffice receivedUS$11 million sent fromthe Philippinesin envelopes marked
•documents;"the companywas convictedof banking law violationsby US federal court
for failingto report the transaction.
This processis describedby Caray and Ellison(1985)who report that former
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False Invoicing of Exports and Imports
Manipulation of trade invoices provides another important mecha-
nism of capital flight. Exporters of goods from the Philippines are
required by law to surrender their foreign currency earnings to the
government for conversion into pesos. To circumvent this requirement
and accumulateforeign currency abroad, the exporter can understate the
true price or quantity of the goods in question on the invoice; the
difference between the invoice value and the actual value is then
deposited abroad. In the case of imports, the same objective can be
achieved through overinvoicing: the importer takes an invoice with an
inflated value to the Central bank to obtain the necessary foreign
exchange,which isthen transferred to the supplier, who in turn deposits
the difference in accordancewith the importer'sinstructions.
Falseinvoicingiswidelybelievedto have been a majoravenuefor
Philippinecapitalflight.Cowitt(1985, p. 675) reportsthat"underinvoicing
of exports and overinvoicing of importsrepresenteda majorpart of the
trade [in the foreigncurrencyblack market],whilebanknotesmuggling
accountedfor lessthan 10 percent."
Kickbacks
Providingkickbackson importcontracts,referredto in politecom-
pany as "commissions,"has a similareffect as importoverinvoicing.In
thiscase,the foreignsupplierpays an individual a portionof itsproceeds
from the sale of goods or services to the Philippines.The exchange
occurs abroad, but the ultimate source of the hard currency is the
paymentfor the importsin question.Perhapsthe mostfamousexample
ofthis in the Philippinesisthe US$80 millionpaidto HerminioDisiniby
WestinghouseCorporation"for assistancein obtainingthe contractand
for implementation services"in the sale of a nuclearpower plant to the
Philippinegovernment.A lawyer who worked on the contractfor the
supplyof the powerplant told The New York Times:
"There was nothing illegal about this contract. But if you look
at the terms closely, you will see that the price of the
equipment being sold to the PhilipPines was inflated, as a way
to cover the cost of the fees to Disini."
In a memo to PresidentMarcos,the Chairmanof the Board of Invest-
mentsdescribedthe transactionas "one reactorfor the price of two."1°
lOThe 7_mes reportedthat 95 percent of Oisini'sfees were then transferredto
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Another documentedexample is the purchase of telecommunk_a-
tions equipment, financed by the US government's Foreign Military Sales
•program, from shell companies which in turn obtained "sham marketing
contracts" with the actual producers "in order to kick back between 35
percent and 50 percent of their proceeds" (Pasztor 1987).11
Inter-Bank Transfers
The role of inter-bank transfers in capital flight is among the most
controversial aspects of the phenomenon, particularly in countries with
foreign exchange controls. Local banks, or local affiliates to foreign
banks, have the ability both to provide foreign exchange and to transfer
it to designated recipients abroad; the only problem is that this is often
illegal.
Water (1987, p. 115) asserts that "banks of international standing
tend to avoid direct involvement in the capital flight process itself." They
do this by preserving what in the US political lexicon is termed "denia-
bility".
"They generally have multiple domestic and foreign relation-
ships with governments, public- and private-sector entities,
individuals and multinational firms, and exposure, especially
of illegal capffal flight activ#ies, is likely to lead to business
losses greater than prospective gains."
Within this constraint, however, the banks are by no means averse to
flight capital:
"[A]II Such institutions will actively solic# fiduciary and other
business from individuals and institutions engaged in capital
flight once the assets are safely offshore. They will also as-
siduously cultivate the various clients involved. In that sense
they may help to reduce information and transaction costs."
While the first-tierbanks'_ill tend to staywell clear of illegal acts,"
Walter notes that "among the foreign-based financial institutions, there
are plenty of second-tier players and shadyoperatorswho have far fewer
Departmentwere dropped without bringingcharges (Pasztor 1987). Further details on the
financialnegotiationsleading,to thereactorsate are reportedby Bello,Hayes and Zarsky
(1979, pp.9-10) and Dumaine (1986).
_The Wall Street Journalreportsthat (ormer Philippinearmed forces commander
General Fabian Ver is =aprincipalsubject"of continuing grandjury investigations intothis
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long-term stakes in the game, and are more than willing to turn a fast
profit at the edge of the law or ethical behavior.''12
One variant of the inter-bank transfer mechanism is the "hidden
deposit" placed by a Filipino with dollars in the Philippine branch of a
domestic or international bank with overseas branches:
"Heor she deposits $115 in the Philippine branch and makes
a private agreement with the bank never to withdraw that
money. The bank then provides the depositor with a $100
loan from an overseas branch of the bank."
The bank profits by the difference between the amount deposited
and the amount "loaned", and through "tax advantages it gains by having
an outstanding loan in its overseas branch" (Carey and Ellison 185)
Measurement of Capital Flight.
The measurement of capital flight requires some statistical detec-
tive work, since the investors.involved "are unlikely to make a point of
informing the compilers of balance of payments.statisticsof their actions"
(Lessard and Williamson 1987, p. 205). Several measures, based on
different techniques employed in the recent capital flight literature, are
discussed below.
"Hot Money" Measure
A relatively narrow measure o1capital flight advanced by Cudding-
ton (1986; 1987) is the sum of certain private, non-bank, short-term
capital movements plus net errors and omissions as recorded in the
balanceof payments..This aims to capture only highly liquid "speculative"
capital outflows; errors and omissions are included "becauseof the wide-
spread belief that [they] largely reflect unrecorded short-term capital
flows" (Cuddington 1986, pp. 2-3)J3
1=Amongsuch "second-tier" institutions was the Australia-based Nugan Hand Bank
whose Manila representative was General LeRoy Manor, the former commander of the
US military bases in the Philippines, who negotiated their renewal with the Philippine
government in 1979. Nugan Hand's known clients include Elizabeth Marcos (sister of the
President) and her husband Ludwig Rocka, who deposited US$3.5 million with the bank
according to records found after its collapse in 1980. See Kwitny (1987, pp. 34-37, 186-
193). Affidavits filed with the Philippine Presidential Commission on Good Government
and documents found in Malacanang Palace indicate that President Marces himself also
sent funds abroad via inter-bank transfers (Malone 1987, pp. 29,31).
1="Neterrors and omissions" are reported as a subheading under "Short-Term
Capital" in the "analytic presentation" for the Philippines in some issues of the IMFBOYCEandZARSKY: CAPITALFLIGHT 199
Deppler and Williamson (1987, p.43) remark that the measure is
"probablyrestrictive,"since long-termassetssuch as equitiesand real
estate "may be relativelyclosesubstitutes" for shortterms assets. Even
if the aim is to focus only upon the "hotcomponent"of flight capital,
whichmovesmostquicklyin responseto changingeconomicand politi-
cal conditions, the measuremaybe overlynarrow.AsCumbyand Levich
(1987, p. 35) observe,"Intoday'sinternational financialmarkets,there is
very little loss of liquidityassociatedwith acquiringlong-term bonds
(especiallyUS governmentbonds,corporatebonds traded on US mar-
kets, or Eurobonds)or equities."The hot moneymeasurecan thus be
regardedas an estimateofthe lowerboundontotalcapital flight,where
the latteris definedto includeall transferswhich reducesocialcontrol
over private capitalowned by residents.
The applicationof this measureto the Philippinesgives the "hot
money"estimatesreportedinthe firstcolumnofTable 114 Netoutflows
(herebearinga positivesign)were recordedin every year except 1984
and 1985, with a peak of US$1.2 billion in 1981. The cumulative
(nominal)outflowby this measure,with no adjustmentfor inflationor
interestearningsonexternallyheld assets,was US$5.6 billion,of which
US$4.0 billionfled from 1976 to 1986. Despitethe narrownessof this
measure,the volumeof capitalflight it capturesis quitesubstantial.
The apparentnet inflowof "hotmoney"in 1984 and 1985 disputes
the conventionalwisdomthat massivecapitalflightfollowedthe August
1983 Aquinoassassination.One possibleexplanationis that with the
collapseof foreign lendingto the Philippines,an importantsource of
financingfor capitalflightdriedup;anotheristhatspeculativecapitalwas
drawnbacktothe Philippines bythe very high-interest 'Uobobills"issued
by the Central Bank(CB) in 1984.
Residual Measures
A set of broadermeasuresof capitalflightbeginswith changesin
the country's total external debt outstanding,includinggross banking
Balance of Payments Yearbook;see, (orexample,Vol. 28 (1977), p. 489. The IMF (1977,
p. 51) statesthatthis practiceisfollowedwhen"thereisevidenceto suggestthatthe vari-
ationsreflectmostlyunrecordedshort-termmovementsof capital." Dombusch(1985, pp,
227-229) employsa similardefinitionof capital flight.
14 " This measure Includes,inadditionto net errorsand omissions,those shortterm,
non-bank,privatecapital movementsrecordedas "otherassets"or "otherliabilities"inthe
balanceof payments.Entriesunder the heading=other loansreceived"(whichcorrespond
to entriesunder the heading"trade credits"in earliervolumes)are excludedsincethese
primarily refer to trade financing. The same technique is used by Cumby and Levich
(1987, pp. 60-61) in theircalculationof the Cuddingtonmeasureforthe Philippines for the
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Table 1
CAPITAL FLIGHT FROM THE PHIUPPINES, 1962-1986
(US$ million)
' = ,, _ Jll
Year Hot Residual Measuresb
Money' Inclusive Non-Bank. Non-Reporting
1962 8 6 25 6
1963 130 175 158 175
1964 160 165 172 165
1965 191 380 343 380
1966 73 268 223 268
1967 60 361 357 361
1968 129 31 7 31
1969 117 174 200 159
1970 158 347 356 362
1971 99 - 41 - 66 - 64
1972 104 136 - 32 - 1
1973 25 10 - 310 34
1974 120 62 - 267 - 1193
1975 220 406 289 1171
1976 460 900 1305 1225
1977 127 645 722 37
1978 227 566 172 660
1979 643 1108 705 1550
1980 267 579 - 237 213
1981 1205 2240 2269 1698
1982 734 1487 1280 1286
1983 248 - 495 216 - 1455
1984 - 197 - 589 - 711 - 1134
1985 - 248 - 208 - 140 - 933
1986 506 732 693 1773
CumulativeTotals:c
1962-69 868 1560 1485 1545
1970-75 727 920 - 30 309
1976-80 1724 3798 2667 3685
1981-86 2248 3167 3606 1235
1962-86 5567 9446 7729 6774
r ,, ., , ' ....
a. Hot money = Sum of "other short-termcapital of other sectors: other
assets"(or equivalententries in earlieryears) plus"net errorsand omissions,"as
reported in IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbooks.
b. Residual measures calculated from data inTable 2.
"Inclusive"= Increaseinexternaldebt outstandingminusyen/dollaradjust-
ment, minuscurrent account deficit, minus net direct investmentoutflow, minus
increase in officialreserves.
"Non-bank"= Inclusive measures minus increase in commercial banks'
external assets.
"Non,reporting"= Inclusivemeasure minus"non-flight"capital outflows.
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system liabilities.Annual estimatesof the Philippineexternaldebt are
discussedin AppendixA. VariousRon-flight uses of this externalcapital
are deducted to ardve at a residualmeasure of capital flight.Three
variants are presentedhere:
a. an "inclusive"measurecalculatedaschangesingrossforeign
debt minusnet directinvestmentoutflow,the currentaccount
deficit, and increasesin officialreserves;
b. a "non-bank"measureinwhichadditions to commercialbank-
ing systemassetsheld abroadare alsodeducted;and
c. a "non-reporting" measurewhich excludesthose externally
heldassetsgeneratinginvestmentincomereported ascredits
in the Philippinebalanceof payments.
All three are reported in Table 1; the data on changes in gross
external debt and non-flightuses of externalcapital from which the
measuresare derivedare reported in Table 2.15
Each of these measuresincludesan adjustmentfor the effect of
yen/dollarexchangerate variationsuponthe dollarvalue of the Philip-
pineexternaldebt.The dollarvalueofyen-denominated debtrisesasthe
yen appreciatesanddeclinesas itdepreciates,contributing to the year-
to-year changes in external debt outstanding reported in Table 2.
Precisedata onthe currencycomposition of the Philippineexternaldebt
are not available, but the National Economic Development Authority
(NEDA) data onthe distribution ofdebtby creditorpermitthe calculation
of the share of debtto Japanese banks,theJapanesegovernment,and
Japanese suppliers'credits, is Multiplyingthis percentageby total debt
as reportedinAppendixA(seeTable A.2) yieldsan estimateofthe dollar
value of yen-denominateddebt at end of each year. The yen-dollar
adjustmentfactorreportedinTable 2 isthe changeindollarvalueof the
previousyear'syen denominateddebt when revaluedat the end-of-the-
year exchangerate.the,adjustment was zerointhe 1960s,whenthe yen
share of total debt was relativelylow and the yerVdollar,raterelatively
stable; it was largest in 1985 and 1986, when the yen appreciated
strongly.
ISlnkeepingwiththe usualpracticein the literature,directinvestmentoutflowsfrom
the Philippinesare I_eeted here as non-flightcapital. The definition of capital flight
proposedabove does not, however,necessarilyexclude directinvestmentoutflows.The
currentquantitiesinvolvedare so small that their _'eatmentmakes littledifference.
tSNEDA (1974, pp, 280-281; 176, pp. 398-399; 1986, pp. 606-607). This share
averaged approximately10 percent in the periodand rose overtime. Unpublisheddata
furnishedby the Central Bank indic, ate that 25.7 percent of foreign exchangeliabilities,
excluding liabilitiesto mui.tiateralagencies, were to Japan at the el
equivaJent to 20 percent ,.'?,otal liabilities.202 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT q
Table 2
NON-FLIGHT FOREIGN EXCHANGE OUTFLOW, 1962-1986
(US$ million)
,_ ..
Foreign Exchange Outflow •
Change In Yen Current A¢_unt I)aflolt InOraase in
External I_onar Net _ Commercial "Non-flight"
Year Debt Adjust- Total Non- Net Oirect II1 Official Banks' Capital
Out- menP Investment Investment Ilweltment haMl_s External Outflows =
ere,riding" Income Income A_te
1962 0 0 -30 -47 17 3 21 -19 HA
1963 20 O - 182 - 199 17 4 23 17 NA
1964 100 0 -85 -111 26 4 16 -7 NA
1965 320 0 - 137 - t66 31 10 67 37 NA
1986 110 0 -161 -198 37 15 -12 45 NA
1967 370 0 25 - 51 76 9 - 25 4 NA
1968 210 0 250 153 97 3 - 74 24 NA
1969 340 0 253 175 79 -6 -61 -26 15
1970 470 O 46 - 82 130 +°9 46 - g - 15
1971 90 27 2 _ 99 101 4 97 25 23
1972 340 5 -7 -132 126 22 184 169 137
1973 160 22 - 474 - 509 113 - 64 668 320 - 24
1974 870 - 29 207 t 53 54 40 591 320 1255
1975 1180 -10 924 796 126 -124 -16 117 -765
1976 1830 27 1102 949 253 -142 -57 -405 -325
1977 1300 146 755 422 333 -215 -30 -77 608
1978 2820 185 1093 667 406 - 100 876 394 - 94
1979 2660 - 300 1496 932 585 - 21 376 403 - 442
1980 3900 357 1901 1069 832 103 960 916 366
1981 3640 -164 2069 1047 1042 -176 -349 -29 542
1982 3790 - 176 3199 1372 1826 - 17 - 703 207 202
1983 140 38 2753 •977 1776 -111 -2044 -710 960
1984 600 - 325 1257 - 848 2104 - 6 263 122 545
1985 830 1155 26 ++ -1975 2002 -20 -123 -69 725
1966 2010 1298 -991 -2941 1950 -140 1111 39 -1041
Curcuiative
Totals:
1962-69 1470 0 - 67 - 446 379 42 - 65 75 15
1970-75 3110 15 700 49 651 -94 1569 950 611
1976-90 12310 415 6346 3998 2389 -375 2125 1131 114
1961-86 11010 1826 8332 - 2367 10899 - 469 - 1845 - 439 1933
1962-66 27900 2255 15311 1194 14117 -696 1784 1717 2672
.... , • , _ , ,
NA - not available,
a, Including grosS external liabilities of the banking systerc+
b, Adjustment for appreciation (+) or depreciation (-) of yan-danorclnated deot.
c. Oudlows positive, inflows negative (opposite ot balance of payments sign oonvention),
d. Calcu_ed as the ratio of private, non-cllmot investment income credits 1othe short-term US Treasury billinterest rate.
Sources: Change in external debt outstanding from Table A.2.
Yen/dollar adjustment based upon percentage sham of Japanese in (oral Ilabt/ities from NEDA ( 1976, pp. 400401;
t 986, pp. 606-607) and unpublished Central Bank data, end exchange rates reported in International Financial
Statistics (IFS 1987, pp. 424-425).
Current account deficit, net dlreot investment, and change in reserves from IMF. Balance of Payments Statlstic_
Yearbook; vatiaus issues (incases of asnflict, data fmrc more recent Issues are used); commercial banks'
external asSets from IMF, International Financial Stat/st_¢s1967. pp. 556-559. line 7 a.d; non-direct in_,estmont
income credits from Balance of Payments Slofistlcs YeadceokS;--line 19; Treasury bill rate 1tom IFS 1907. pp
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t. The inclusive measure. The inclusivevariant of the residualmeas-
ure pegged the total capital flight from the Philippines in the 1962-86
period at US$9.4 billion. This is perhaps the most widely used measure
of capital flight. For example, it is employed by Diaz-Alejandro (1984, pp.
362-363), Sachs (1984, p.397), the Bank for International Settlements
(1984, p. 101), Erbe (1985), and the World Bank (1985, p.64).1_
The formula by which this measure is derived can be traced in
Table 2. The total increase in external debt outstanding in this period
reached US$27.9 billion; of this, US$2.3 billion was attributable to the
rise in the dollar value of yen-denominated debt, with an adjusted inflow
of US$25.6 billion. Direct investment also contributed a net inflow of
US$0.9 billion. The adjusted "gross capital inflow" was thus US$26.5
billion. Of this amount, US$1.2 billion covered the cumulative deficit on
the non-investment income portion of the current account. A further
US$14.1 billion represented net investment income payments primarily
composed of interest payments on the external debt itself. Net additions
to the country's official reserves amountedto US$1.8 billion. The remain-
der -- US$9.4 billion -- is the inclusive estimate of capital flight.
Although the broadest among the residual measures, this compu-
tation is incomplete in that it excludes capital flight through false trade
invoicing and the interest earnings of flight capital, It also includes
unrecorded foreign exchange outflows used to finance the smuggled
portion ol Philippine imports. Adjustments for these are considered
below.
The non.bank measure. The non-bank measure of capital flight
deducts from the preceding measure US$1.7 billion in external assets
accumulated by Philippine commercial banks over the 1962-86 period;
this yields a total capital flight estimate of U$$7.7 billion. The Morgan
Guaranty Trust Company of New York (1986)used the measure in its
widely reported capital flight estimates. Whether or not private banking
system assets should be excluded from the measure of capital flight is
open to debate. Cumby and Levich (1987, pp. 32-33) question whether
there is sound "justification for treating the banking system differently
from other firms and individuals." Cudclington(1986, p.4, n. 2) offers the
rationale that '1he central bank directly and indirectly controls a large
fraction of commercial banks' foreign assets in many developing coun-
tries."
In the Philippines, government linancial institutions (such as the
Philippine National Bank and the Development Bank of the Philippines)
and '_olitical banks," which enjoyed a "special relationshipwith the group
17Two of these authors, Sachs and Erbe, report estimates for the Philippines. These
and other es_nates are discussed in Appendix B.204 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
in government,"accountedfor morethan half of the totalassetsof the
commercialbankingsystemin 1982 (De Dios et al. 1984, p. 38). The
degree of socialcontroloverthe externalassetsof thesebanks isopen
to doubt. As Patrickand Moreno (1985, p. 363) observe, the political
powerof majorfinancialgroupsimpliesthat '1heydo nothaveto takeas
giventhe rulesof the economicgame as determinedby government."
The inclusivemeasureof capitalflightmaythusbe preferabletothe non-
bank measure.
The non-reporting measure. The finalvariantof the residualmeas-
ure is basedonthe proposition thatsome private,non-directinvestment
capitaloutflowsare motivatednot by a desireto reducesocial control
overprivatecapital,butratherby a simpledesirefor portfoliodiversifica-
tion.Do01ey(1986, pp. 3, 15) proposesthatcapitalflightbe definedas
'1hat part of the estimated stock of external claims that yields no
recordedinvestmentincometo the creditorcountry."Failure to report
investmentincome,he argues, is evidenceof a "desireof residentsto
obtain financial assets and earnings on those assets which remain
outsidethe controlof the domesticauthorities."
Private,non-directinvestmentincomecredits are reported in the
balance of payments;combiningthese with data on overseas interest
rates (for which the short-term US Treasury bill rate serves as a
convenientindicator),one can derive an estimateof the stockof non-
flightprivateexternalassets(including thoseof commercialbanks).The
year to year changesin this stockare reportedunderthe heading"non-
flightcapitaloutflows"in Table2. Deductingthisfromthe inclusivecapital
flight measure gives what is heretermed the "non-reporting"measureof
capital flight: a tota_of US$6.8 billion in the period 1962-86.
Is the absence of recorded investment income really a better
indicator of loss of social control than the simple transfer of capital out
of the country? As Dooley (1986, p.15) notes, capital flight by this
definitioncanoccur afterthe actual transfer of capital: it "does not require
a change in the stock of total claims on nonresidents but only that
earnings on existing claims be placed outside the control of the domestic
authorities," hence "capital flight can occur, and be reversed, very
rapidly." if external assets can be readily transformed in this way, this
suggeststhat, in practice, exit itself entails substantialloss of social
control-- an argumentin favor of the inclusiveoverthe non-reporting
measure.
Mlslnvoicing Adjustment
The foregoing measuresof capitalflight do nottake into account
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voicing of exports and overinvoicing of imports are believed to be
importantvehiclesfor capitalflight. If so, the trade and currentaccount
deficitsareoverstated,andcapital flightas estimatedbythe hotmoney
and residualmeasuresis understated.
On the other hand, 'lechnicalsmuggling" via under invoicing of
imports, and "pure smuggling"in which legal importchannelsare by-
passedcompletely,are also reportedto have been widespreadin the
Philippines.The motive in this case is the evasionof tariff and other
importbarriers.This has the oppositeeffect: the trade and currentac-
countdeficitsareunderstated, and capitalflightisoverstatedsincefunds
which appear to have fled the country are in fact used to finance
unrecordedimports.
The net impactof misinvoicing upon totalestimatedcapitalflightis
the sum of these twocontradictoryeffects.
Table3 presentsannualestimatesof the net impactof misinvoicing
for the periodunder review. These are based on comparisonsof trade
flows as recordedby the Philippinesand its industrialcountry trading
partners,asreportedin the IMF's Direction of Trade Yearbooks.In 1986,
for example,the Philippines reportedexportsto the UnitedStateswith a
total value of US$1.71 billion,while the US reported importsfrom the
Philippines witha totalvalueof US$2.15 billion.Adjusting for freightand
insurancecosts(usingthe PhilippineFOB/CIF ratioreportedannuallyin
the IMF's International Financial Statistics ), the comparisonindicates
that Philippineexportsto the US were underinvoicedby US$320 million
inthatyear.Totaldiscrepancies for industrialcountrytradingpartnersare
scaledupwards(bytheir ratiosto totalPhilippineexports and importsin
a givenyear) to generate the globalestimatesreported in the table.18
On the exportside, the data reveal a consistentpatternof under-
invoicing,In all but two of the 25 years, the value of importsfrom the
Philippinesrecorded by its trading partners exceeded the value of
exports (adjustedfor shippingcosts) recordedby the Philippines.As a
wl_le, the average discrepancyfor the period was equivalentto 13
percentof the recorded value of exports; in the 1980s it rose to 24
percent, or nearly US$1.2 billionper year.19
On the importside, the data show consistentunder - ratherthan
leThismethodologyreliesuponthe assumptionthat thetrade data reportedby the
industrialcountriesare reasonablyaccurate.Gulati (1987, p. 70), who employsthe same
technique,reportsthat tradedata comparisons amongthe industrial countriesindicatethat
this assumptionis "for the most part realistic."
1°Exportsto the Philippinesby top three trading partners-- the United States,
Japan, and Wast Germany-- were undarinvoicedby averagesof 7 percent,20 percent
and 71 percent, respectively.The extraordinarilyhighfigure for West Germanymay be
partly attributableto misidentificationof the final exportdestinationas the Netherlands;
trade data comparisonsrevealconsistent"overinvoicing" of Philippineexportstothe latter.206 JOURNALOF PHILIPPINE bEVELOPMENT
Table 3
TRADE INVOICING DISCREPANCIES, 1962-1986,
(US $ million)
, , lw _ , n,
Export Import Capital Flight
Year Discrepancy' Discrepancyb Mlslnvolclng
Adjustmentc
, • L •
1962 81 51 30
1963 - 3 209 - 212
1964 37 161 -, t24
1965 29 183 -, 1'55
1966 72 184 - 111
1967 144 223 - 79
1968 178 305 - 127
1969 305 312 - 7
1970 129 319 - 190
1971 112 286 - 17'4
1972 101 248 - 147
1973 - 46 298 - 344
1974 63 - 32 96
1975 ,458 203 255
1976 133 253 -, 1.21
1977 250 266 ':- 16
1978 438 659 - 221
1979 593 640 - 47
1980 949 623 .326
1981 1071 593 477
1982 1181 541 640
1983 670 1194 - 324
1984 1395 803 592
1985 1516 886 _30
1986 1223 923 300 ,
Totald 11277 10332 945
a. Exportdiscrepancy= Trading partners'importsfrom the Philippines
(recordedPhilippineexportsx (CIF/FOB factor). -_
b. Importdiscrepancy= (Tradingpartners'exportsto the'PhililC_eSx
CIF/FOB factor)-- recordedPhilippineimports. , -
c. Misinvoicing adjustment = Exportdiscrepancy --iml:x>rt:dismeloartcy. _
d. Figures were rounded.
Sources:IMF, Directionof TradeYearbooks.
IMF,/ntemational Financia/
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overinvoicing. This indicates that capital flight through import overin-
voicingwas exceededin magnitudeby smugglingthroughunderinvoic-
ing or non-reportingof imports. The average net discrepancywas
equivalentto 15 percentof the recordedvalue of imports; in the 1980s
itfell to 11 percent. 2°
In the 1960s,the misinvoicing adjustment to capitalflightestimates
is downward:impactof smugglingswampednot only import overinvoic-
ing butexport underinvoicing aswell. In the 1970s, the pictureismixed,
withexPortunderinvoicing exceedingthe netimportunderinvoicing intwo
year.sand almostequallingit intwoothers.In the 1980s,the capitalflight
effect Oenerallyoverwhelmedthe smuggling effect, necessitating upward
adjustmentsof our previouscapitalflight estimates. The misinvoicing
adjustmentconsequentlyhasa noticeableimpactuponthe timetrendof
capital flight. Its net effect upontotalestimatednominalcapitalflight in
1962-86 isan additionalUS$945 million.
Itshouldbe emphasizedthatthisfairly modesttotaldoesnotimply
thattrade invoicemanipulation hasbeena relativelyunimportantmecha-
nism of capital flight. On the contrary, export underinvoicingalone
amountedto $11 billioninthe entireperiod.The misinvoicing adjustment
capturesthe net effectof a) capitalflightvia falsetrade invoicing; and b)
the use O!unrecordedcapitaloutflowsto financethe undeclaredportion
of Philippir_e_imports. 21it is quite possiblethat cash and wire transfers
were the majormechanismsforundeclaredimport finance,whileexport
underLnvoiCing andimport overinvoicing were primarily vehiclesof capital
f,ght. •- .
Inflation and Interest Adjustments
,,
i Inflationand interestadjustmentsare reported in Table 4 for two
alternativeSummary estimates of capital flight from the Philippines.
Measure A isthe inclusivevariantof the residualmeasurereported in
Table 1 plusthe misinvoicing adjustmentreported in Table 3. Measure
B is the narrow, "hot money" measure reported in Table 1 plus the
misinvoicing adjustment.The formeris,in ourjudgment,the bestmeas-
ure of capital flight as defined here, _ the latter is reported as a
=°lrnp0rtsby the Philippines from the US, Japan, and West Germany were under-
reportedby averages of 12 percent,25 percentand 4 percentrespectivelyin that period.
=IA notionof the scaleofthe lattercan be derivedfromAlano's(1984, pp. 185-187)
estmate that in the period1965-1978, smuggledimportsrepresented29 percent of the
valueof exports to the Philippinesas recordedby its lrading partners.
=Zlnthis paper,capital flightis definedin termsof loss of serial control.If lossof
acq_ssto the foreignexchange earningson capital (and consequentreductionin debt
se_ir_r_ capacity)were ourprimaryconcern,thenthe restrictivemeasurewouldbe more
appro$)date.208 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Table 4





Year Nominal Real (with Interest
(current $) (1986 $)" adjustment)b
A B A B A B
1962 36 38 255 269 37 39
1963 - 37 - 82 - 251 - 561 1 - 43
1964 41 36 271 240 42 - 8
1965 226 36 1436 231 274 29
1966 157 - 38 958 - 235 448 - 9
1967 282 - 19 1703 - 113 756 - 29
1966 - 96 2 - 565 13 698 - 28
1969 167 110 942 620 917 84
1970 157 - 32 842 - 174 1138 56
1971 - 215 - 75 - 1110 - 387 967 - 18
1972 - 12 - 43 - 56 - 212 995 - 63
1973 - 334 - 319 - 1439 - 1373 719 - 398
1974 158 216 552 757 939 - 205
1975 661 474 2122 1524 1674 272
1976 779 339 2273 989 2556 633
1977 628 111 1670 295 3336 780
1978 345 6 852 14 3934 842
1979 1061 596 2287 1285 5444 1553
1980 905 593 1661 1087 7035 2361
1981 2717 1682 4407 2729 10934 4494
1982 2127 1374 3105 2006 14347 6423
1983 - 820 - 76 - 1074 - 100 14728 6898
1984 3 395 3 455 16141 7971
1985 422 382 436 395 17787 8965
1986 1032 806 "" 1032 806 19g12 10329
Total 10391 6512 22312 10561 (19912) (10329)
Key: A = Inclusiveresidualmeasure plus misinvoicingadjustment.
B = Hot money measureplus misinvoicing adjustment.
a. Convertedto 1986 dollarsusingworldwholesaleprice indexas reported
in IMF, International Financial Statistics 1987, pp. 110-111.
b. End-of-yearcumulativetotals, includinginterest calculatedon mid-year
cumulatedstock (using short-termUS Treasury bill rate as reported in
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minimal estimate of capital flight.
In nominalterms,totalcapitalflightfromthe Philippines from 1962
to 1986 amountedto US$10.3 billion(by our preferredmeasureA). its
magnituderelativeto the country'sUS$28.3 billionexternal debt out-
standingat the endof 1986 canbe betterappreciatedby converting the
annualflowsintorealterms,oralternatively by imputing interestuponthe
stockof flightcapitalaccumulatedover the period.The resultsof both
typesof adjustmentsare reported in Table 4. The totalvalue of capital
flightfromthe Philippines (by measureA) in 1986 dollarswas US$22.3
billion-- equivalentto 79 percentof the country'sexternaldebt.2_The
cumulative stock of flight capital, based on the interest rate of US
Treasurybills, stoodat $19.9 billionat the end of 1986.
Concluding Remarks
Capital flightfromthe Philippinesdid not commencein the mid_
1970s. In the eight years precedingthe 1970 foreignexchangecrisis,
capitalflight(estimatedby ourpreferredmeasure)amountedto US$776
million, equivalentto US$4.7billionin 1986 dollars.However,the outflow
of flightcapital in real termsappearsto have peakedin 1976 and again
in 1981-82. Notwithstandingtheir differences,each of the alternative
capitalflightmeasuresreportedabove displaysbroadlysimilartrends.
Measuresof capitalflightare necessarilyimperfect.In particular,
none of the measures reportedabove capturescapitalflight occurring
throughthe mechanismof kickbackson import contracts.Unlikefalse
invoicing,this cannotbe detected by tradingpartnerdata comparisons,
since the kickbacksenter into the purchase price reported by both
parties. If capitalflightby thismechanismwas substantial,the estimates
reported heremaybe toolow.24 Insofarasdollarssuppliedto the black
market are unrecordedin the Philippinebalanceof payments,their re-
export also escapes detection. A further avenue for non-detectable
capital flight may be transactions between Philippine residents working
abroad who wish to obtain pesos at the black market rate, and those in
the Philippines who wish to acquire dollars for transfer abroad.2s
=_Thecorrespondingreal totalsfor the non-bank and non-reportingvariants of the
residualmeasureare US$16.6 and US$16.8 billion,respectively.
=" On the exportside, the practice of "reinvoicing," whereby Philippineexporters
"sell" goodsat a low priceto a foreign-basedcompanywhich in turn re-sells them at a
higher price to the final buyer, likewiseescapes detection. Carey and Ellison (1985)
report that some exportersestablished frontcompanies in HongKongfor this purpose.
=SRather than smugglingdollars totheirfamiliesin the Philippinesvia a "networkof
couriers"(as reportedby Cowilt, 1985 p. 671), overseasworkerscouldsell dollarsabroad
for pesos at home, eliminating the costs and risks of currency smuggling in both
directions.We have found no reference to such transactionsin the literature,but it is
unlikely that the opportunities for intermediationhave escaped the notice of Binondo
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The estimates presented above neverthelessindicatethat capital
flight from the Philippinesfrom 1962to 1986was substantial indeed. Our
best estimate is that capital flight during this period amounted in real
terms to almost four-fifths of the country's external debt outstanding at
the end of 1986. The policy implications of this finding are open to
debate; the magnitudes involved suggest that the debate should be
vigorous.BOYCE and ZARSKY: CAPITAL FLIGHT 211
Appendix A: The Philippine External Debt, 1962-1986
This appendixreviewsthe availa_e data on growthof the Philip-
pine external debt and its compositionin terms of type of borrower
(publicor private sector). The PhilippineCentral Bank establisheda
statisticalsystemin 1971to monitorthe country'sexternaldebt.Although
the WorldBank(1984, p. 43) hascharacterizedit as "oneof the best in
Asia and the Far East," substantialdiscrepanciesstill exist among
Philippineexternaldebt estimatesreportedby differentsources.
One reason for these discrepanciesis that many estimatesrely
upon incomplete data on the volume of debt. Another is the use of
differentdefinitionsof externaldebt.
Some Definitional Problems
One definitional distinctionis betweenloan commitments and loan
disbursements. In officialdevelopmentassistanceprojectloans,for ex-
ample, fundscommittedat the startofthe projectare typicallydisbursed
over a number of years as constructionor other project activities
proceed. In these cases, the data presented here pertain to actual
disbursements.Similarly,inthe case ofthe monetarysector(the Central
Banksand commercialbanks),creditlines maybe drawn downgradu-
ally;sometimestheyare neverdrawnat all. The openingof a creditline
representsa commitment,whiledrawingsuponthat creditlinerepresent
disbursements.
A seconddistinctionisbetweengross and net externalliabilities
of the Central Bankand commercialbanks.The CentralBank has both
external liabilitiesand internationalreserves.Similarly,Philippinecom-
mercial banks have cross-borderdeposits which constitute external
liabilities,but at the sametime holdexternalassetsincludingdepositsin
foreign banks. Net external liabilitiesof the bankingsystemare gross
external liabilitiesminus gross external assets. In keeping with the
general practice,the Philippineexternaldebt is here definedto include
grossexternal liabilitiesof the bankingsystem.Increasingthe banking
system's internationalreserves is thus one possible use of foreign
borrowing.
A furtherdefinitional pointrelatestothe treatmentof the assetsand
liabilitiesof offshorebankingunits(OBUs),whose establishmentin the
Philippines was permittedby a 1976 PresidentialDecree.Twenty-eight
foreign banks had set up OBUs in the Philippinesas of 1984; they
borrowand lendin foreigncurrencies"outsidethe regulatoryframework
of banksoperatinginthe Philippines"(IMF 1984, pp. 69-70). Contraryto
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treat OBUs as overseas bank. Thus OBU lending to the Philippine
residentsis includedin the country'sexternaldebt statistics, whileOBU
external liabilitiesare not. As of June 1986, Philippinedebt to OBUs
stood at US$2.5 billion,whilethe OBUs owed US$3.7 billionto other
foreignentities.The net effectwas to understatethe Philippineexternal
debt (comparedwiththatwhichwouldresultfromthe conventionaltreat-
ment of OBUs)by US$1.2 billion.The debt statisticsreportedherewere
providedby Philippineauthorities,and hencefollowtheirpracticeinthis
regard.
A final definitionaldistinctionis between public sectordebt and
privatesectordebt.Two practicesblurthe distinction.First,foreigndebts
have beenincurredbygovernmentagenciesfor on-lending to the private
sector. For example, the government-ownedPhilippineNationalBank
provided'1he chiefconduitfor privateexternaldebt" in the early 1970s
(Wellons 1977, p. i63). Similarly, the Central Bank's Consolidated
ForeignBorrowingProgram(CFBP), establishedin 1978, borrows(pri-
marilyfrom foreigncommercialbanks)inthe nameof the Central Bank
and on-lendsthe proceedsto private and public sector borrowersvia
Philippinebanks. By the end of 1982, totalCFBP on-lendingstood at
US$2.0 billion,of whichmorethan half representedrefinancingof prior
foreignobligations(IMF 1984, p. 65; WorldBank 1984,p.39). In theory,
foreign funds on-lent to the private sector are recorded as private
externaldebt, togetherwith directborrowingby the privatesector.The
second practicerefers to the Philippinegovernmentguaranteeingthe
repayment of much private debt. Considerableamounts of publicly
guaranteedprivate obligationswere in the end assumedby the public
sector as privateborrowersdefaulted,but the classification of suchdebt
priorto defaultmay differ among data sources(see Wellons 1977, pp.
164, 186).
Data Sources
The timeseriesfor the Philippine externaldebtutilizedinthispaper
is basedon data from severalsources.These are summarizedin Table
A. 1, andthe reconstructed 1962-86 timeseriesisreportedinTableA.2.
Afterthe Philippinedebtmoratoriumwas declaredin October1983,
the govemment revealed that the country'stotal indebtednessas of
October 17 reached US$24.6 billion,a sharpjumpfrom the previously
acceptedfigureof US$18 billion.(Rafferty 1983, p. 101; Peagam 1984,
p. 57). The discrepancy arose primarilyfrom the exclusionof the
monetary sector debt and revolving(as opposed to fixed short-term)
creditsfrom priorestimatesissuedby the CentralBank;theseturnedout
to be muchhigher than had been previouslyknown.The CentralBankBOYCE andZARSKY: CAPITAL FLIGHT 213
Table A.1














1970 956 2297 2297
1971 1009 2393 2368
1972 1171 2732 2663
1973 1225 2886 2846
1974 1519 3755 3538 3900
1975 2234 4939 4392 5200
1976 3323 6768 6345 7200
1977 3889 8069 8035 8600
1978 5281 10694 10608 11200
1979 6528 13352 13192 13900
1980 8522 17252 17122 18100
1981 11304 20893 20291 21800
1982 13887 24677 23797 25000






Unpublisheddata i:xovidedby the Central Bank of the Philippines,
Departmentof EconomicResearch (International) and Financial
Plan Data Center.
Source: Jurado (1966, Table 4, p.373); Wellons (1977, Table 1 (1), p.162);
NEDA (1976, Table 11.8, pp.398-9); NEDA (1986, Table 15:12, pp.606-7);
IMF (1984, Table 12, p. 72); Alfiler(1986, Table 1, p. 23).214 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Table A.2
EXTERNAL DEBT OF THE PHILIPPINES, 1961-1986'
(US $ billion)
Total Borrowing Sector Real Total
Year Outstanding Public Private (1986 $)b
1961 0.36 0.17 0.19 2.58
1962 0.36 0.19 0.17 2.53
1963 0.38 0.23 0.15 2.60
1964 0.48 0.28 0.20 3.18
1965 0.80 0.46 0.34 5.09
1966 0.91 0.50 0.41 5.56
1967 1.28 0.68 0.60 7.72
1968 1.49 0.76 0.73 8.79
1969 1.83 0.90 0.93 10.33
1970 2.30 1.10 1.20 12.37
1971 2.39 0.92 1.47 12.35
1972 2.73 1.11 1.62 13.39
1973 2.89 1.15 1.74 12.44
1974 3.76 1.57 2.19 13.19
1975 4.94 2.33 2.61 t5.87
1976 6.77 3.52 3.25 19.74
1977 8.07 4.03 4.04 21.45
1978 t0.69 5,69 5.00 26.38
1979 13.35 7.65 5.70 28.77
1980 17.25 10.25 7.00 - 31.64
1981 20.89 12,80 8.09 33.88
1982 24.68 15.43 9.25 36.03
1983 24.82 16.74 8.09 32.54
1984 25.42 17.55 7.87 29.31
1985 26.25 19.12 7.13 ; 27.17
1986 28.26 21.83 6.43 28.26
a. End-of-yearestimatesof externaldebt outstanding,includinggrossbanking
system liabilities.
b. Worldwholesalepriceindexfrom IMF (1987, pp. 101-1) used as a proxyfor
the internationalinflationrate.
Sources:1961-63: Jurado(1966, p. 373).
1964-69: Wellons (1977, p. 162); originalestimates scaled up to
adjustfor ,1completeness.
1970-86: Unpublished data providedby the CentralBank of the Phil-
ippines,Departmentof Ecoiiomic Research (International)
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subsequently extended the more comprehensive debt estimates to ear-
lieryears.
The Central Bank'sFinancialPlan Data Center has compiledthe
officialdata on externaldebt from 1983 onwards.The Central Bank's
Departmentof EconomicResearch (International)haspreparedcompa-
rableestimatesfor the years 1970 through1982. The annualtotalspre-
sented in Table A.1 includethe monetarysector(that is,grossexternal
liabilities of the CentralBankand commercialbanks)as well asthe non-
monetary sector. The Central Bank estimates for the non-monetary
sectorare brokendownintopublicandprivatesectordebt,and intoshort
versusmediumandlong-termdebt. Estimates for the monetarysectorfor
1983-86 are classifiedinto liabilitiesof the Central Bank, government
commercialbanks, and private commercialbanks, again permittinga
public/privatebreakdown. For the 1970-82 period, commercial bank
liabilitiesare not subdividedinto governmentand private banks; the
publicand privatesectordebtestimatesreportedin Table A.2 for these
yearsarebasedonthe assumption thatgovernment banksaccountedfor
20 percentof totalcommercialbank liabilitiesin thoseyears.
The IMF (1984) and Alfiler(1986) givealternativeestimatesWhich
accordfairlywith the CentralBankdata reportedhere.
Jurado (1966) has data on Philippineforeign loansfrom 1906 to
1963;onlyhis 1961-1963 figuresareincludedhere.His estimates,taken
fromthe Central Bank'sDepartmentof EconomicResearch, appear to
be quitecomprehensive. Dataon bothpublicand privatesectordebtare
given, and fromnotes to the table it appears that the monetary sector
debtisincluded.The 1961-1963 estimatesreportedinTableA.2 arethus
taken directlyfromthis source.
Forthe years 1964-69,the estimatesinTable A.2 are derivedfrom
thedata presentedby Wellons(1977), whichcorrespond tothe estimates
of external debt classified by institutionalsource reported by NEDA
(1974, 1976, 1986). The sourceof thesedataisthe CentralBank.On the
basisof a 1975 interview,Wellonsreports(p. 186), that the data for the
1960s are "incomplete".The data refer only to a "public sector" debt,
althoughas Wellons (pp.1-63-164)notes, the categoriesof publicand
privatedebtoverlapsince:a) the government-owned PhilippineNational
Bank was the "chief conduitfor private external debt;" and b) the
government'sDevelopmentBank of the Philippines"guaranteed sub-
stantialprivateforeigndebt." The extentto whichthese are includedin
the WelIons/NEDAseries is "unclear" (Wellons, p. 164); but Wellons
(p.186) suggeststhatthe inclusionof somepubliclyguaranteedprivate
debt may help to account for the "astonishing"discrepancybetween
thesefiguresandthe (lower)estimatesreportedbythe WorldBank.The
inclusionof somepubliclyguaranteedor on-lentprivate debt mayalso216 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
explain why Welions' estimates exceed Jurado's public sector debt
figuresfor 1961-1963.
Owingtotheir incompleteness, the Welions/NEDAestimatesforthe
year 1964 to 1969 must be scaledup to make them comparableto the
earlier and later estimatesdiscussedabove. The ratio of the Wellons
estimateto Jurado'sestimatefor 1963 is 0.67; the ratioof the Wellons
estimatesto the Central Bank estimatesfor 1970-73 is 0.425. Accord-
ingly, the Wellons estimates for the interveningyears were scaled
upwardson the assumptionthat they represent a proportion of total
externaldebtwhichdeclinedlinearlybetweenthesepoints(thatis,0.635
in 1964, 0.60 in 1965.....0.46 in 1969). The resultingestimatesof total
debt are divided into public and private debt in a similar fashion,
interpolating the trend of their relativesharesfromthe observationthat
the publicshareof totaldebtdeclinedfrom 0.61 in 1963to 0.48 in 1970.
The trends interred here are consistentwith other assessments
NEDA (1976, pp. 400-401), in an alternativedebtseries(whichincludes
privatedebtbut isapparently lesscomprehensive with respectto public
debtthan the seriescited here), also indicatesthat the publicshare of
total externaldebt declinedin the late 1960s. The World Bank (1976,
p.472) reportsthatthe share of publicsector in totalmediumand long-
termdebtdeclinedfrom48 percentin 1964to 29 percentin 1969. Both
sourceslikewiseshowthatthe publicsharethenrosein the early 1970s.
The debt estimatespresentedin TableA.2 for the years 1964-69
shouldthenbe regardedas rougherapproximations thanthosefor other
years.
Aside from those in Table A.1, several otherestimates of the 1
Philippineexternaldebtwere made.Oftenusedfor international compari-
sons, the estimatesreported in the World Bank's World Debt Tables, .I
have been woefully understated;the 1984-85 edition, for example,
reports total Philippineextemal debt in 1983 at US$13.7 billion,com-
prisedof US$10.4 billionpublicor publiclyguaranteeddebt and US$3.3
billionprivatedebt. Power(1983, p.8) notesthatthe World Debt Table
figuresdo not fully capturenon-guaranteedprivate debt; in this case,
they also appearto understatepublicdebt.
The WorldBank's (1984, p. 58) greycover report on the Philippine
externaldebtgivesestimatesfor 1976-82 whichare verycloseto those
providedby the Central Bank.A subsequentWorld Bankreport (1986,
Vol. 3, p. 31) has estimatesfor 1974-85 whichappear to be based on
incompletedata; they are lowerthanthose reportedby the WorldBank
(1984) and by the Central Bank, For example, the 1982 estimate of
US$17.0 billionis less than the net as well as gross liability-based
estimates (US$19.1 billion and US$24.3 billion,respectively)of the
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The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD 1985, 1987) has produced what may be the best sets of
internationally comparable estimates of external debt for the years 1983
through 1986. These estimates are reasonably consistent with those
presented above. Earlier data published by the OECD were much less
complete (see David and Lee 1986, for a comparison of the old and new
OECD series).
Appendix B: Other Estimates of Philippine Capital Flight
This appendix summarizes estimates of Philippine capital flight
which have appeared elsewhere, and briefly compares them tO the
estimates derived in this study.
Most studies reported only cumulative totals for various time
periods. These are presented in Table B.1. Cumby and Levich (1987) and
Dooley (1986) provide annual data as reported in Table B.2.
Table B.1




Source Period Method Capital Flight
Sachs 1979-1982 Inclusiveresidual 200
Erbe 1976-1982 inclusiveresidual 0
Dooley 1975-1983 Non-reporting residual 8000
MorganGuaranty 1976-1982 Non-bankresidual 7000
MorganGuaranty 1983-1985 Non-bankresidual 2000
Khanand UI Haque 1974-1982 Non-reportingresidual 8400
Cumby and Levich 1976-1984 Inclusiveresidual 5040
Cumby and Lavich 1976-1984 Non-bankresidual (3680)
Cumby and Levich 1976-1984 Hot money 3714
Cumby and Levich 1975-1984 Non-reportingresidual 4500
Sources: Sachs (1984, Table 1, p. 397); Erbe (1985, Table 1, p. 271); Dooley
(1986, Table E 39, p, 67); MorganGuaranty (1986, Table 10, p. 13);
Khan and UI Haque (1987, Table 1, p. 4); Cumby and Levich(1987,
Tables 3A.5 and 3B.4, pp. 60-61, 66-67).218 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Table B.2
ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATES OF ANNUAL PHILIPPINE CAPITAL FLIGHT
(US$ million)
Anual flow" Cumulative stockb
Year (Cumby & Levich)
A B C Cumby & Levich Dooley
1975 800 250O
1976 581 986 459 1500 4500
1977 1084 1161 127 2500 6900
1978 " 831 437 227 4300 8500
1980 1119 303 267 7000 9500
1981 1795 1824 1205 7700 9700
1982 908 701 734 8200 11700
1983 - 904 (- 833) 248 4300 8000
1984 - 1010 - 1132 - 196
a. Estimate A ,= inclusivevariantof residualmeasure.
EstimateB = non-bankvariantof residualmeasure.
EstimateC = hot moneymeaure.
b. Non-reportingvariant of residual measure.
Sources: Cumby and Levich (1987, Tables 3A.5 and 3B.4 pp. 60-61, 66-67). j
Dooley (1986, Table E39, p. 67).
• The estimates of Sachs (1984) and Erve (1985, both of which are
derived by the inclusive variant of the residual method, are quite low; the
primary reason appears to be understatement of the increases in the
Philippine external debt from which residual estimates of capital flight are
derived.
The Morgan Guaranty Trust Company (1986) estimates are some-
what higher than the corresponding estimates of the non-bank residual
measure reported in Table 1. One source of discrepancy is the absence
in the Morgan Guaranty estimates of a yen/dollar adjustment for currency
valuation effects upon the external debt outstanding. Differences may
also come from different debt estimates used by Morgan Guaranty and/
or from a slightly different definition of banking•system external assets.
The hot money estimates reported by Cumby and Levich (1987)
are virtually identical to those reported in our Table for the corresponding
years. The Cumby-Levich residual estimates differ from ours again
primarily owing to the absence of a yen/dollar adjustment in their figures_
The Cumby-Levich non-bank residual estimate, meanwhile, is off byBOYCE and ZARSKY: CAPITAL FLIGHT 219
US$639 millionowingto an errorin their recordingof bankingsystem
foreign assets for the year 1983;this amountshould be added to the
figures in parenthesesin the tables to obtain correctedestimates.
The estimatesof the non-reporting variantof the residualmeasure
reportedby Dooley(1986) and Khanand Ul Haque(1987) aresomewhat
higherthan ours, while the Cumby-Levichestimate of this measure is
slightlylower.The discrepanciesreflectdifferencesin data and method-
ologies,aswell as the absenceinthe other studiesof the yen/dollarad-
justment.
A significantfeature of the annualdata in Table B.2 is that they
supportthe findingthat,contraryto widespreadperception,capitalflight
was lowor negativein 1983-84. This pointisdiscussedinthe maintext
of our article.
None of the estimates summarized in this appendix include adjust-
ments for misinvoicing of exports and imports, nor do they incorporate
the inflation and interest adjustments reported,in our financial capital
flight estimates in Table 4.220 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
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